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Risk analysis of conventional and solo watch keeping 
By 
Peter Friis Hansen and Preben Terndrup Pedersen 
Department of Naval Architecture and Offshore Engineering 
Technical University of Denmark 
Building 101E, DK-2800 Lyngby 
 
 
Summary 
As a part of the safety evaluation of trials with officers of the watch to act as the sole lookout 
during periods of darkness the Danish Maritime Administration has initiated the present study. 
The objective is to compare a conventional bridge with solo watch keeping during the day and 
with a rating as lookout during the night with a bridge equipped for and having solo watch 
keeping during periods of darkness with the possibility to call a backup if necessary. The 
conventional bridge is a modern bridge and the main technical difference between the 
conventional bridge and the bridge allowing for solo watch keeping during periods of darkness is 
technical equipment in the form of a graphic position display system, an alarm transfer system, 
and improved bridge layout. The study compares these two systems and evaluates whether a 
vessel operated with solo watch keeping on an integrated bridge performs as well as a vessel with 
a conventional bridge having a rating lookout at night. The analysis takes into account that if 
conditions of weather, visibility, proximity of dangers to navigation, or traffic situation causes 
solo watch keeping being unsafe, then the Officer of the Watch on the bridge equipped for solo 
watch keeping will call a backup officer to the bridge. The analysis also takes into account that if 
similar conditions on a conventional bridge cause solo watch keeping during daylight to be 
unsafe, then the Officer of the Watch will call a rating lookout to the bridge. 
The analysed critical situation, within which the two bridge systems are compared, is defined as:  
“During the watch the considered vessel is on collision course with an object.  
Machinery and steering gear are functioning.” 
At the initial point of the analysis it is assumed that the collision object is so far away that the 
Officer of the Watch (OOW) has no means of detecting the object.  The objective of the study is 
then to model whether or not the OOW is able to act in time such that the potential collision is 
avoided.  It is hereby implicitly assumed that if the OOW acts in time, then the potential collision 
with the object is avoided.  It is noted that the OOW not acting in time does not necessarily imply 
that a collision will take place. In this study we are not interested in identifying whether a 
collision actually occurs, but only in the probability of the OOW acting in time. 
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The analysis procedure is based on numerical evaluations using Bayesian Networks. Using 
Bayesian Networks allows for taking into account the time aspect in the analysis. To the authors’ 
knowledge no other study has included the different time windows caused by changing visibility. 
The results from the Bayesian Network have been sought verified by extending the model to 
estimate the probability that two large vessels on a collision course actually will collide. This 
comparison shows that the applied modelling results in probability levels of the correct order of 
magnitude. The established model has also been used to calculate the dependence of risk of 
collision on visibility. In accident statistics, registered from 1966 to 1971, the relationship 
between visual range and degree of risk has been evaluated by Japanese researchers [7] and the 
risk found to be approximately proportional to 1/r1.6, where r is the visibility. The present model 
gives proportionality factors that are lower (1/r1.1), but comparable.  A lower proportionality 
factor should be expected since radar technology has improved during the past three decades, and 
since the effect of the radar on the safety in low visibility is significant. 
A comparison of probabilities that the OOW does not act in time on the conventional bridge with 
similar results for the OOW not acting in time on the solo watch bridge is shown in the following 
table.  
P[OOW not acting] : All weather conditions – all objects 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.00270 0.00155 
Daylight 0.00330 0.00141 
Darkness 0.00209 0.00169 
 
From this table it is seen that the probability that the OOW does not act is lower for the bridge 
equipped for solo watch keeping than for the conventional bridge. It is noted that the above 
probabilities account for terminated solo watches due to reduced visibility both on the 
conventional bridge during daylight and on the solo watch keeping bridge day and night. 
 
Danish ships with bridges equipped for solo watch keeping at night have in addition to the alarm 
safety system, which ensures that an alert officer is present at the bridge, also an off-track and 
collision warning system connected to the alarm safety system. The effect of this system to call a 
backup if the OOW fails to act is not included in the present analysis. However, it is evident that 
the effect will further reduce the probability that the OOW on the bridge equipped for solo watch 
keeping does not act.  
 
Therefore, the conclusion of the present study is that solo watch keeping during day and night on 
an integrated bridge is safer than a conventional bridge with solo watch keeping during day and 
watch keeping together with a rating as look out during night. 
 5
 Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to present a quantitative study of the risk associated with solo watch 
keeping at night in good weather conditions and low ship traffic at open sea. This is done by 
quantifying the difference in risk between on one hand a ship with an integrated bridge system 
operated with one man on the bridge also at night and on the other hand a similar ship with a 
conventional bridge system where besides the navigator also a rating is assigned as lookout 
during periods of darkness. The analysis procedure is based on numerical evaluations performed 
by means of a Bayesian Network. 
Several studies with the same objective have been performed recently. Det Norske Veritas [1] 
have presented an assessment of the navigational risk associated with the bridge design described 
in MSC/Circ. 566 with one officer on watch and dispensing with the dedicated lookout in normal 
visibility. This risk is compared to the risk associated with the conventional bridge with one 
officer on watch and lookout at night as a routine. The analysis is based on fault tree assessment 
of failure when a ship is on a dangerous course. The conclusion of the DNV study is that the sole 
lookout on an integrated bridge reduces the mean navigational risk. 
In a comprehensive report initiated by order of the German Federal Ministry of Transport Froese 
et. al. [2] described the background for the international development towards a set of IMO 
requirements for tests with solo watch keeping during periods of darkness. In this report is 
presented a comparative risk assessment using the first two steps in a formal safety assessment, 
i.e. identification of the hazards and the assessment of risks associated with those hazards using 
event tree analyses. The result show that the better technical equipment compared to the 
conventional ships combined with an effective organisation with quick availability of a qualified 
backup compensates for the absence of an additional rating. 
In The Netherlands Schraagen et. al. from TNO Human Factors Research Institute [3] carried out 
a study to determine whether a single person on an integrated bridge provides at least the same 
degree of safety as in cases where two persons on a conventional bridge fulfil the function. The 
study includes on-board observations as well as controlled simulator studies. The onboard 
observations were carried out both on conventional and on integrated bridges where the 
integrated bridges conform to the “Draft requirements for solo watch keeping during periods of 
darkness” (NAV 40/25, Annex 18). The observations show that due to the improved navigational 
aids on the integrated bridge the Officer of the Watch (OOW) acting as the sole lookout spent 
more time on lookout than the OOW on conventional bridges. The simulator study was carried 
out in conditions, which are unlikely for sole lookout situations. But even under these conditions 
the report concludes that the presence of a lookout does not result in a higher percentage of visual 
detection of objects on the sea, and that the presence of rating as lookout does not lead to lower 
workload of the OOW. Altogether the Dutch study found that on integrated bridges with the 
OOW acting as sole lookout, at least the same degree of safety can be provided as on 
conventional bridges. 
For the Swedish Maritime Administration Wikman and Andersson [4] have performed fault tree 
analyses for various bridge designs manned with one officer alone. The safety of these designs 
has been compared to the safety of a conventional bridge with one officer and one lookout. That 
is, the conventional bridge is such that if it is provided with a system which verifies the alertness 
of the navigational watch officer at intervals not exceeding twelve minutes it will fulfil the 
requirements for a sole lookout bridge according to MSC/Circ. 566. The results of this study 
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show that collision warning and grounding systems connected to an alarm transfer system 
significantly increases the safety of the ships with sole lookout compared to a conventional 
bridge. The analysis also shows that the simple alertness alarm transfer system is not sufficient to 
replace a rating as lookout. 
Besides these in-depth analyses statistical results of trials with one-man bridge operation during 
periods of darkness have been carried out during the trial period, see Ref. [5]. 
Finally, it can be mentioned that tests are presently conducted with one-man bridge operation 
even along heavily trafficked coastal routes, see for instance [6]. These vessels have been 
equipped with an integrated navigation system that includes special features such as audio input 
and output equipment as the main man-machine interface between the navigator and the 
integrated navigation system. Besides such features, the integrated navigation system also 
includes a stranding and collision avoidance system, which automatically plans a route for the 
ship to take in order to avoid such potential dangers.  
In the present investigation we shall supplement the above mentioned previous studies by 
carrying out a risk analysis which takes into account the time aspect. 
Objective of the study 
The objective of the present study is all in all to compare a vessel with a modern conventional 
bridge and a rating as lookout at night with a vessel with a bridge equipped for and having solo 
watch keeping during periods of darkness. As described in Ref. [3] the technical difference 
between the two bridge types is that the bridge allowing for solo watch keeping is equipped with 
a graphic position display, an alarm transfer system, and an improved bridge layout.  The task of 
the study is therefore – by some means – to compare these two systems and to evaluate whether a 
vessel operated with solo watch keeping during periods of darkness performs as well as a vessel 
operated with a rating at night on a modern conventional bridge. The analysis must take into 
account that if conditions of weather, visibility, or traffic situation causes solo watch keeping 
being unsafe, then the Officer of the Watch will call a backup officer to the bridge. The analysis 
must also take into account that if similar conditions on a conventional bridge cause solo watch 
keeping during daylight to be unsafe, then the Officer of the Watch will call a rating lookout to 
the bridge. 
To compare the two bridges we will in this study model a given critical situation and compare the 
performance of the two bridges within this model universe.  The considered critical situation and 
the interpretation of the critical situation are qualitatively described in the next section. 
Qualitative description of the considered critical situation 
It is generally accepted that most collisions between ships can be attributed to human failure. 
Anyway, in the present analysis it is assumed that the machinery and the steering gear are 
functioning. Therefore, an analysis of collision rates must be based on a study of the navigator’s 
role in resolving critical situations. In the present investigation we have chosen to break the work 
of the Officer of the Watch (OOW) down into four cognitive phases: 
1. Perception of the situation. Visual realisation of the presence of other ships or floating objects 
or perception of other ships or floating objects by instruments such as radar, radio etc. 
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2. Assessment of the perceived information either mentally or using auxiliary devices for 
plotting, computing etc. From the moment the OOW realises that a ship or an object is 
present in the vicinity of his own vessel it will take him some time to determine the relative 
speed vector such that he can decide whether there is a situation on which he has to react. 
3. Decision-making based on the assessment of the current situation taking into account the 
traffic situation, manoeuvring capabilities etc. 
4. Action in the form of new navigational courses or changes in speed. 
In the following study of the effect of solo watch keeping we shall restrict the analysis to the 
phases 1 and 2. In the analysis we consider a specific critical situation occurring during a watch 
keeping.  The considered situation is defined as: 
“During the watch the considered vessel is on collision course with an object.  
Moreover, machinery and steering gear are functioning.” 
The definition of “a collision” should be considered in a broader perspective than just a physical 
collision.  Considering safe navigational operation, collision in this context also includes passages 
within a (vaguely defined) safe domain of the vessel and the object. 
At the initial point of the analysis it is assumed that the collision object is so far away that the 
OOW has no means of detecting the object.  The objective of the study is then to model whether 
or not the OOW is able to act in time such that the potential collision is avoided.  It is hereby 
implicitly assumed that if the OOW acts in time, then the potential collision with the object is 
avoided.  It is noted that the OOW not acting in time does not necessarily imply that a collision 
will take place.  If the potential collision object itself is able to evade, then a collision may not 
take place.  This would be the case if the potential collision object were a vessel since this, of 
course, might be able to counteract the risk of collision, whereas a floating object would not.  In 
this study we are, however, not interested in identifying whether a collision actually occur, but 
only in the probability of the OOW acting in time. 
The considered critical situation and the primary model parameters are illustrated below: 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the considered critical situation. 
 Navigational route 
Vessel 
Object 
Visual distance 
Time for detection 
Minimum distance to 
avoid critical situation
Legend: 
v1 
v2 
The figure shows the considered vessel with speed v1 and the object with speed v2 with which the 
vessel is on collision course.  The legend in the figure explains the case of a visual detection. The 
object may in general be detected either visually or by means of the radar.  The basic mechanisms 
in visual and radar detection are, however, similar, and a same type of legend to the one given in 
the figure may therefore be established for radar detection. 
In the explanation of the primary modelling parameters we consider, as shown in Figure 1, the 
case of a visual detection.  The figure shows that, at the initial point of the analysis, the object is 
so far away that the OOW has no means of detecting the object.  When the object is within a 
certain range from the vessel (illustrated by the sun in the figure) the object may be detected. This 
situation represents the above-mentioned phase 1 of the cognitive process. The visual distance 
will be dependent on visibility and on the type of object. 
In order to assess the perceived information (phase 2) and to perform an evasive manoeuvre to 
avoid collision with the object the vessel will need at least a specified minimum distance.  This 
minimum distance is shown as the lightning in the figure.  The minimum distance required to 
perform the evasive manoeuvre is dependent on the size and manoeuvrability of the considered 
vessel, the vessel speed, and on the conditions of the navigational route.  The conditions of the 
navigational route will be dependent on the traffic density and on the confinement of the 
navigational route. 
The distance between the visual distance and the required minimum distance for performing an 
evasive manoeuvre defines the distance within which the OOW must detect the object in order to 
be able to act in time.  This distance may be converted into a time period within which the OOW 
(or lookout) must detect the object.  The available time period is defined in terms of the relative 
speed between the vessel and the object. 
When the lookout duty takes place a certain time period will elapse before the lookout has 
scanned the sea surface for potential objects, say 360-degree.  Even if the lookout duty is 
performed at a highly skilled and concentrated level there will always be a probability of the 
lookout not seeing an object when this is within the detectable zone.  Sometimes even the 
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concentrated lookout will require two or more scanning of the sea surface before the object is 
identified.  Moreover, all personnel on the bridge will be engaged in different tasks.  These tasks 
will interact with the person’s ability of performing the lookout duty and divide the persons 
attention between the different task.  Finally, if too much external interference occur, then the 
person on the bridge may feel stressful and consequently divide his attention to the different 
required tasks in an irrational manner causing further increase in the time for scanning the sea 
surface. 
A detection model for radar detection may be formulated in a way similar to the above given 
visual detection model.  If either a visual detection or radar detection has taken place then it is 
assumed the OOW has assessed the situation and will act and thereby avoid the collision. 
The comparative risk analysis of conventional and solo watch keeping should be able to capture 
the above model.  It may be argued that conventional and solo watch keeping will only differ in 
the number of personnel on the bridge and instrumentation, and any study should therefore 
concentrate only on the manner the OOW and other personnel divides their attention between the 
different tasks to be performed.  We certainly agree on the vital importance of the performance of 
the personnel on the bridge, but find it paramount that the risk analysis evaluates the 
consequences of the performance in a proper perspective.  Unfortunately, conventional risk 
analyses may be defeated by application to the present problem formulation, and the risk analysis 
therefore calls for alternative tools.  One such tool is described in the subsequent section. 
Motivation for introducing Bayesian networks 
Most practical risk analysis problems are characterised by a large set of interrelated uncertain 
quantities and alternatives.  Within the conventional risk analysis different methods such as fault 
tree analysis and event tree analysis have been developed to address these problems.  A fault tree 
analysis seeks the causes of a given event, and an event tree analysis seeks the consequences of a 
given event.  The two analysis techniques are supplementary methods, and when applied 
correctly the formulated model may reveal the entire probability structure of the model.  Both 
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis – applied separately and combined – have in the past 
with success been used in the evaluation of the risk of various hazardous activities. Unfortunately, 
both fault tree and event tree analyses do have their drawbacks.  Firstly, it is difficult to include 
conditional dependencies and mutually exclusive events in a fault tree analysis (a conditional 
dependency is, for example, the dependence of the visibility on the weather; mutually exclusive 
events are, for example, good weather and storm).  If conditional dependencies and mutually 
exclusive events are included in a fault tree analysis the implementation and the pursuing analysis 
must be performed with utmost care. Secondly, the size of an event tree increases exponentially 
in the number of variables.  Thirdly, the global model, which is combined fault trees and event 
trees, generally becomes so big that it is virtually impossible for third parties (and sometimes 
even for first parties) to validate the model. 
A Bayesian Network is a graphical representation of uncertain quantities (and decisions) that 
explicitly reveals the probabilistic dependence between the set of variables and the flow of 
information in the model. A Bayesian Network is designed as a knowledge representation of the 
considered problem and may therefore be considered as the proper vehicle to bridge the gap 
between analysis and formulation. 
A Bayesian Network is a network with directed arcs and no cycles.  The nodes (to which the arcs 
point) represent random variables and decisions.  Arcs into random variables indicate 
probabilistic dependence, while arcs into decisions specify the information available at the time 
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of the decision. As an example, one node in the network may represent the weather, whereas 
another may represent the visibility.  An arc from weather to visibility indicates that visibility is 
conditionally dependent on weather.  The diagram is compact and intuitive, emphasising the 
relationship among the variables, and yet it represents a complete probabilistic description of the 
problem.  For example, it is easy to convert any event tree or fault tree into a Bayesian Network.  
Conversely, it may not always be an easy task to convert a Bayesian Network into a combined 
fault tree and event tree. 
A drawback of Bayesian Network is that they require the state space of the random variables (the 
nodes) to be defined as discrete states.  In our above-mentioned example of weather and 
visibility, the state space of weather may easily be discretised into states as good weather, storm, 
etc., whereas the state for visibility more naturally would have been defined as a continuous state 
space.  The Bayesian Network modelling does, unfortunately, require the state space of visibility 
to be discretised in ranges as for example, 0 to 1 km, 1 to 2 km, etc.  Although this is mentioned 
as a drawback, neither fault trees nor event trees offer any better alternatives.  A consequence of 
the discretisation is partly that the result of the Bayesian Network may be sensitive to the selected 
discretisation, and partly that the calculations involved in the evaluation of the Bayesian Network 
grow almost exponentially in the number of states of the nodes.  The latter is a consequence of 
Bayesian Networks encodes the entire probabilistic structure of the problem. 
A focus on the causal relationship among the variables most effectively does the building of a 
Bayesian Network.  This implies that a Bayesian Network becomes a reasonable realistic model 
of the problem domain that is useful when we try to get an understanding about a problem 
domain.  In addition, knowledge of causal relationships allows us to make predictions in the 
presence of interventions.  Last, but not least, the model building through causal relationship 
makes it much easier to validate and convey the model to third parties. 
We will not give any details here on how Bayesian networks are analysed.  Instead reference is 
left to Jensen [10] and Pearl [11].  
Qualitative description of the formulated Bayesian network. 
This section gives a qualitative description of the Bayesian network established for analysis of the 
risk associated with sole lookout.  The objective is to convey the idea of building the network 
through the causal relationship among the variables.  In the building process we will describe 
modelling aspects of the nodes and for some also describe their actual states.  The subsequent 
section will give a thorough description of the states of each node and how the conditional 
probability distribution is assigned. 
The network presented in this section, aims only at describing the tasks of the Officer of the 
Watch (OOW).  The network does thereby neither represent a model of a conventional bridge nor 
a bridge allowing solo watch keeping but a system which is relevant for both of these two bridge 
types.  When this part of the Bayesian network is properly modelled and understood, it is 
straightforward to add effects of rating lookout or calling a backup in a critical situation. 
 
Figure 2: Bayesian Network for Officer of the Watch.  The network defines the common part for 
both the conventional bridge and the solo watch keeping bridge. 
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As already described the network aims at modelling a specific situation where the considered 
vessel is on collision course with a given object.  The objective of the network is then to model 
whether or not the OOW acts in time such that the potential collision is avoided. 
The OOW has two different means of detecting the particular object: either visually or by means 
of the radar equipment.  The left and right hand sides of the network given in Figure 2 relate to 
these detection means, respectively.  The top node of the network is the “Weather”.  The weather 
is modelled as having the states “Good weather”, “Storm”, “Rain or Snow”, “Heavy rain” and 
“Fog”.  The condition of the weather clearly has influence on the visibility.  The node “Visibility” 
defines the meteorological visibility and is modelled as a distance in kilometres.  The node 
“Visual dist.” describes the maximum distance a given object may be visually detected.  It should 
be understood that the visual distance is the distance at which a lookout first may identify and 
interpret an object knowing that a specific object eventually will appear in a given direction.  The 
visual distance is dependent on the considered type of object, whether the object is sought 
detected during day or at night, and on the meteorological visibility.  The node “Daylight” models 
the condition of the day, and the node “Object” models the considered potential collision objects. 
As potential collision objects we in this study consider “Large vessels”, “Small vessels”, and 
“Floating objects”.  Returning to the node “Visual dist.”, it is noted that during night the 
possibility of detecting both a large and a small vessel are almost identical since it is the lights of 
the vessels that are identified whereas the difference is larger for the situation during day.  The 
formulated causal relationship allows for taking these effects into account. 
Speed reducti
Weather Radar status
Day light
Visibility
Object type
Visual dist.
Radar dist.
Obj. rel. speed
Visual time
Radar time
Vessel speed Traff ic intensit
Maneuv. timeTime for visual Time for radar
Other alarms OOW training
Stress level
Bridge
OOW Task
Alarm transfer
Looking freq
Radar freqOOW visual
OOW radar
OOW acts
Not only the visibility but also the detection range of the radar is dependent on both the weather, 
the object, and, of course, on whether the radar is functioning or not.  The node “Radar status” 
gives the status of the radar.  In case of a storm, sea clutter may affect the detection range of the 
radar whereas heavy rain may cause rain clutter and thereby cause shielding of objects behind the 
rain cloud.  It is assumed that (light) rain or snow has no impact on the detection range of the 
radar, but only on the visibility.  The node “Radar dist.” models the maximum detection range of 
the radar.  Distances up to 16 nautical miles are considered as the relevant range of the radar.  It is 
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noted that the node “Object” has a causal link to both the node “Visual dist.” and the node “Radar 
dist.”.  This implies that the network becomes able to model correlation between the visual 
distance and the radar range.  Consider, for example, a floating object, which hardly is detectable 
on the radar but also, difficult to visually detect, especially in darkness.  The modelling of the 
network assures that such dependencies are captured. 
Given the maximum distance for visual detection and for radar detection, the next task is to 
transform this distance into a time period within which either visual detection or detection by 
means of the radar must take place.  This time period is directly related to the relative speed 
between the object and the modelled vessel.  The relative speed is given in knots and is described 
by the node “Obj. rel. speed”.  As seen in Figure 2 the relative speed is dependent on not only the 
node “Vessel speed” but also the node “Object type” since the three considered objects must be 
expected to travel with different speeds and courses.  Knowing the relative speed and the visual 
or radar distance to the object, it is a simple task to calculate the time within which the object may 
be identified either visually or by the radar.  The two nodes “Visual time” and “Radar time” give 
the required time in minutes. It is noted that the vessel speed is dependent on whether a “Speed 
Reduction” has taken place. The node “Speed reduction” defines whether reduced visibility 
causes a speed reduction to take place. 
However, to avoid the potential collision with the object it is not sufficient just to identify the 
object within the visible time or the radar time, since also the required time (or distance if 
preferred) for performing the required evasive manoeuvre must be accounted for.  The node 
“Maneuv. time” describes the required manoeuvring time and is dependent on both vessel speed 
and traffic intensity.  The causal dependency of the manoeuvring time on the traffic intensity 
implies that an evasive manoeuvre will require longer time in a relatively high trafficked (or 
confined) area than in a low trafficked area.  The node “Traffic intensity” is modelled with the 
states “Low”, “Medium”, and “High”.  Knowing the required manoeuvring time, the “Time for 
visual” and “Time for radar” are simply established by subtracting the manoeuvring time from the 
visual or the radar time. 
The part of the network that we have described until now models the physical boundaries of the 
considered collision problem.  The next step is to identify whether the OOW manages to detect 
the object either visually or by means of the radar within the available time period.  The physical 
boundaries of the network are more or less apparent, whereas modelling of the OOW reaction 
system is more disputable since it involves the modelling of the human aspects.  We have 
selected the following causal modelling. 
The stress level of the OOW is causal dependent on both the training levels of the OOW and on 
the number of other alarms or unforeseen action the OOW must confront during watch keeping.  
The node “Other alarms” defines the expected number of alarms and the node “OOW training” is 
modelled as “Low”, “Medium”, or “High”.  The node “Stress level” defines the stress level in 
terms of “Low”, “Medium”, or “High”.  The stress level influences the ability of the OOW to 
rationally divide his attention between the different tasks he must handle.  The node “OOW task” 
contains the states “World”, “Radar”, and “Other”.  “World” meaning that the primary task of the 
OOW at the instant in time is to perform the lookout duty, “Radar” meaning that the primary task 
is to interpret the radar signal, whereas “Other” covers other duties such as correcting charts, time 
tables, toilet, etc.  It is noted that the node “Bridge” also has an influence on the task of the OOW.  
This dependency is included in the network for clarity, since the time available for performing the 
different tasks differs for the two bridge systems.  This is because the solo watch keeping bridge 
is equipped with a graphic position display and therefore allows for a different fraction of time 
spent on the considered tasks. 
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Both the frequency with which the OOW scans the sea surface (node “Looking freq.”) and the 
frequency with which the OOW scans the radar (node “Radar freq.”) is influenced by the current 
task of the OOW.  These frequencies are also dependent on the node “Alarm transfer” which 
again is dependent on actual bridge type.  A solo watch keeping bridge is equipped with an alarm 
transfer system that requires the OOW to react to this system within given time intervals.  
Typically the time interval will be set to 10 minutes.  The impact of the alarm transfer system in 
the modelling is that the looking frequency and the radar frequency cannot exceed this limit (this, 
however, does not imply that the detection time will be less than 10 minutes).  Considering the 
looking frequency, this frequency models a shorter duration of a scanning of the sea surface in the 
case of the OOW performing the lookout duty.  The OOW being looking at the radar does not 
imply that he will not be scanning the sea surface.  His mind will be concentrated on the radar, 
but he will even though look up with intervals to scan the sea surface.  The impact is that the 
duration of the scanning of the sea surface will be longer.  Similar for the case when the OOW is 
performing other duties.  The radar frequency is modelled similarly. 
Whether the OOW is able to detect the object depends on the time for visual observation and the 
looking frequency.  As previously mentioned the looking frequency models the time duration of 
one scanning of the sea surface.  One such scanning does, however, not imply that the OOW 
surely will detect the object.  Sometimes several scans of the sea surface would be required 
before the object is detected.  The node “OOW visual” models the possibility of the OOW being 
able to detect the object within the available time period.  The node “OOW radar” is modelled in 
a similar manner. 
Finally, the OOW acting is dependent on either visual or radar detection.  The node “OOW acts” 
describes this. 
In a following section the network described above will be extended to specifically model the 
conventional bridge and the solo watch keeping bridge.  The upper half of the network remains 
unchanged for cases when either a rating or a backup is present at the bridge.  For the case when a 
Backup is present, the lower part of the network (below “Time for visual” and “Time for radar”) 
will be duplicated.  For the case of a rating being present, the lower left side of the network will 
be duplicated. 
Assigned conditional probability distributions 
In this section we describe the assigned conditional probability distributions to all the nodes 
introduced in the previous section.  The assigned probabilities are for some nodes based on 
available statistics or defined through mathematical relations.  For other nodes the conditional 
probabilities are estimated based on subjective expert judgement.  The basis for the assigned 
probability distributions will be clearly stated.  The table below gives an overview of the basis for 
the assessment of the conditional probability distributions. 
Node Statistics Mathematical Subjective 
Weather √   
Visibility √  (√) 
Object type   √ 
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Daylight √   
Visual distance   √ 
Radar status √   
Radar distance   √ 
Vessel speed  √  
Object relative speed  √ (√) 
Visual time  √  
Radar time  √  
Traffic intensity   √ 
Manoeuvring time   √ 
Time for visual  √  
Time for radar  √  
Other alarms (√)  √ 
OOW training √   
Stress level   √ 
OOW task   √ 
Alarm transfer √  (√) 
Looking frequency   √ 
Radar frequency   √ 
OOW visual  √  
OOW radar  √  
OOW acts  √  
 
Weather 
The statistical data for weather is obtained from Sparre [8] who reports statistics of wind, 
visibility, air temperature, cloud amount, and weather recorded for 13 different light vessels 
located in Danish waters in the period from 1931 to 1960.  Most of the light vessels have been 
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located in inner Danish Water.  Appendix A summarises the statistic for data recorded at the light 
vessel Vy1.  This vessel is located in the North Sea and the available data is therefore judged to 
be applicable for the present study.  More precisely, Vy1 was located approximately at 55o23’N 
and 7o36’E.  Vy1 was not operating during the Second World War.  Each day six observations 
have been made.  The observation were performed at 4 a.m., 8 a.m., 12 noon, 4 p.m., 8 p.m., and 
12 midnight C.E.T. (Danish time).   Although [8] only reports limited information on the 
correlation between the recordings of weather and visibility, the data have been found relevant for 
the present study. 
In the modelling the following states are defined relevant for representing the weather - or rather 
for modelling the influence of weather on visibility and radar performance:  
 
 
 
 
Weather type Number of days 
Good 327 
Storm 14 
Rain or snow 19 
Heavy rain 0.5 
Fog 4.5 
 
The considered weather types and the associated number of days of occurrences are identified on 
the following basis: 
Fog: It is assumed that fog causes visibility to be less than 1 km and that fog only may occur 
when the Beaufort number is between two and four.  Assuming further that 75% of all visibility 
less than 1 km are due to fog, the probability of fog may be found by a summation over Beaufort 
wind speeds 2, 3, and 4, and subsequently multiplying this value by 0.75. 
Rain and snow: The annual average number of days with rain from 1931 to 1960 is given 
in [9] as 16 days.  The number of days with rain cannot be deduced from the Light vessel data [9] 
described in the previous section since that study registered occurrence of precipitation in any 
degree during the day.  However, 16 days of rain appears to be reasonable by comparing to the 
12.2 days of registered thunderstorms and 11.2 days of registered hail given in [8].  No data was 
found which defined the number of days with heavy snow.  Ref. [8] indicates that snow in 
average is experienced 25 days of the year.  It is assumed that heavy snow occurs 3 days of the 
year.  In total, the modelling therefore assumes that rain or snow is experienced 19 days of the 
year. 
 16
Heavy rain: No data was found which defined the number of days with heavy rain.  However, 
Ref. [8] report 12.2 days of registered thunderstorms and 11.2 days of registered hail.  It is 
therefore assumed that heavy rain occur ½ a day of the year. 
Good weather: Good weather is defined as weather with large visibility and wind speeds less 
than or equal to 6 Beaufort.  The resulting number of days is extracted from [8] as the number of 
days with Beaufort Nos. less than or equal to 6 and subtracting days with rain, snow or fog.  Good 
weather is present 327 days of the year. 
Storm:  Storm is defined as Beaufort wind speeds larger than or equal to 7.  Storm is present 14.5 
days of the year. 
 
Visibility 
The node “Visibility” defines the probability distribution for the visibility conditional on the 
weather.  As no study has been identified which defines the required basis, these distributions 
have been established on a subjective basis.  As background material for the subjective 
assessment Tables in the Appendix give the marginal distribution for the visibility and correlation 
between wind speeds and visibility.  In the assignment of the conditional probability density 
functions it was required that the resulting assigned marginal cumulative density function should 
agree with the observed cumulative density function for the visibility.  The assigned conditional 
probability density functions have been estimated in terms of truncated Weibull distributions.  
These continuous distributions are afterwards discretised.  The upper truncation limit on the 
visibility is 60 km; that is, in the modelling it is assumed that visibility larger than 60 km cannot 
occur.  The truncation limit has only impact on the distribution for the visibility in good weather.  
The assumed distributions for visibility are given below. 
 
The format of the truncated Weibull distribution is 
γγα β ≥−−= xCxxF ;/])(exp(1[)(  
In which α and β are distribution parameters, γ is the lower truncation level, and C is a 
normalising constant assuring that F(60 km) = 1. 
The parameters describing the obtained Weibull distributions are: 
Weather Good Storm Rain / 
snow 
Heavy 
rain 
Fog 
α 0.01174 1.007E-04 0.4083 1.910 1.910 
β 0.674 4.714 0.746 0.749 0.749 
γ 10.0 0.40 0.10 0.0 0.0 
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Figures in Appendix A show the estimated conditional density functions for visibility.  These 
figures also compare the obtained marginal distribution for visibility with the observed 
distribution.  For information only, the expected visibility conditional on the different weather 
conditions is given below.  These values give an indication of the implication of the weather 
definition. 
Weather Good Storm Rain/ 
snow 
Heavy 
rain 
Fog 
Expected visibility 28.9 km 6.8 km 4.0 km 0.45 km 0.45 km 
 
In the Bayesian network modelling, the discrete domain of the node visibility contains 30 
intervals, and the division in kilometres among these are: 0.25; 0.5; 0.75; 1; 1.25; 1.5; 1.75; 2; 
2.5; 3; 3.5; 4; 4.5; 5; 5.5; 6; 6.5; 7; 7.5; 8; 8.5; 9; 9.5; 10; 12.5; 15; 17.5; 20; 25; 30.  An 
argumentation for the selection of the upper limit is given under node “Visual distance”. 
 
Object type 
Three different types of objects are considered relevant for the analysis.  These are large vessels, 
small vessels, and floating objects.  We have not specified any firm definition of the boundary 
between large and small vessels, but vessels with length less than 75 m belongs to our defined 
class of small vessel.  The assigned probability distribution is 
Type Probability 
Large vessels 600 / 1000 
Small vessels 399 / 1000 
Floating objects 1 / 1000 
 
Floating objects are slowly moving objects and they are not visible on radar. The estimated 
number of floating objects is probably too high. The reason for this choice is to ensure a fair 
comparison where the probability for collision will be conservative for the solo watch bridge. 
Daylight 
The node “Daylight” contains the states “Daylight” and “Darkness”.  Both states are given 50% 
of probability. 
Visual distance 
The visual distance is defined as the maximum distance a qualified lookout may detect a given 
object. The visual distance is defined conditional on the visibility, the type of object, and whether 
the observation takes place during daylight or darkness. In clear weather the maximum visual 
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distance between two ships depends on the distance the observer is lifted above the water surface 
and the air-draft of the ship on collision course. The air-draft of a ship is defined as height from 
the baseline to the top of the deckhouse less the (water) draft. Based on a series of measurements 
on drawings the average air-draft for large ships is taken as 25 m and for small ships the average 
air-draft is taken as 12 m. 
If we assume that the observer is placed 23 m above the sea surface on a large vessel then the 
visual distances based on the visible horizon will be 38 km for observation of large vessels and 32 
km for observation of small vessels. Similarly, if the observer is placed 9 m above the sea surface 
on a small vessel the calculated visual distance is 31 km for large vessels and 24 km for small 
vessels.  These considerations leads to that the node “Visual distance” is subdivided into the same 
set of states as the visibility, that is 30 states. 
Since the total table for the node contains in total 30·30·32 = 5400 entries (with the majority of 
these being zero) we will not give the total table, but only describe the idea behind the assignment 
of the conditional probabilities. 
 
1. The visual distance cannot exceed the visibility, which implies the probability of 
experiencing any visual distances beyond which the given visibility is zero. 
2. A floating object is during daylight assumed to be detectable up to a maximum distance of 2 
km, whereas during darkness this maximum is 0.5 km.  These maximums are, of course, 
dependent on the visibility.  Due to different types of floating objects it is assumed that visual 
distance of a floating object is triangularly distributed between 0.25 km and the maximum 
value with the most likely value equal to 0.25 km. 
3. Large vessels are during daylight assumed to be visible at a distance equal to the visibility.   
4. Small vessels are during daylight assumed visible at a distance equal to the visibility provided 
that the visibility is less than 9.5 km.  For visibility larger than 9.5 km a triangular 
distribution is applied with the most likely value being 9.5 km and the upper limit equal to the 
visibility. 
5. During darkness large vessels are assumed to be visible at a maximum distance from 15 km 
to 20 km (8–10 nautical miles).  A triangular distribution is assigned with a most likely value 
equal to 15 km.  For lower visibility ranges, the distribution is truncated accordingly. 
6. During darkness small vessels are assumed to be visible at a maximum distance from 10 km 
to 20 km (6–10 nautical miles).  A triangular distribution is assigned with a most likely value 
equal to 10 km.  For lower visibility ranges, the distribution is truncated accordingly. 
 
Radar status 
The radar status has the states “Fault” and “OK”.  On the basis of the DNV study [1] the 
probability of experiencing a radar fault during a watch is 5·10-5.  The assigned failure probability 
is estimated under the condition that the radar is checked prior to each watch shift. 
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 Radar distance 
The radar distance is defined as the maximum distance at which a given object may be identified 
with position and course on the radar. The radar distance is defined conditional on the weather, 
the type of object, and the status of the radar.  Like in the modelling of the visual distance, the 
node “Radar distance” is subdivided into the same set of states, that is 30 states.  This range 
reflects the standard setting of most radar within 12 to 16 nautical miles  Also this node contains 
so many states that we also here will describe the modelling verbally. 
1. If the radar is in a fault condition the radar distance is defined to be 0 km. 
2. A floating object is assumed not to be detectable by the radar.  The radar distance is therefore 
set to 0 km. 
3. In good weather, in rain/snow, and in fog large and small vessels are assumed to be 
detectable in the range from 20 to 30 kilometres.  A triangular distribution is assigned within 
this range with a most likely value of 30 km.  This implies that in good weather a vessel is 
expected detected with position and course by the radar at approximately 13 nautical miles. 
4. In heavy rain radar the detection distance for large and small vessels is given a uniform 
distribution from 0 to 30 km.  A uniform distribution is assigned because rain clutter will 
affect the capabilities of the radar.  
5. In storm wave clutter and effects of large waves may impinge on the radar detection ability.  
Modern radar technology, however, is able to correct for a large amount of these effects.  In 
the modelling we have assumed that 95% of all large vessels are detected as well as in good 
weather.  Because of wave clutter, the remaining 5% are given a uniform distribution 
between 0 km to 20 km.  For small vessels 75% are assumed detected as well as in good 
weather.  The remaining 25% are uniformly detected at distances between 0 to 20 km. 
 
Speed reduction 
In conditions with low visibility some ships will reduce their speed. However, in open sea the 
reduction is judged to be low. 
For visibility less than 250 m one out of twenty ships are assumed to reduce speed to half the 
normal speed and with a visibility larger than one kilometre no ships will reduce their speed.  The 
modelled fraction of vessels reducing speed is given below: 
Distance 0.25 km 0.5 km 0.75 km 1.0 km 
Probability of 
speed reduction 1 / 20 1 / 50 1 / 100 1 / 1000 
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Vessel speed 
Only a single vessel speed is considered namely 15 knots.  When speed reduction takes place, 
speed is assumed reduced to 7.5 knots. 
 
Object relative speed 
The object relative speed models the relative speed and course between the vessel and the object.  
The node is defined conditional on both vessel speed and object type.  The maximum projected 
speeds of the considered objects are: 
 
 
 
Object  Maximum speed 
Large vessels 15 knots 
Small vessels 10 to 15 knots 
Floating objects 0 knots 
 
The node is given 6 states and the following conditional distribution: 
Speed 7.5 knots 15 knots 
State Large 
vessel 
Small 
vessel 
Floating 
object 
Large 
vessel 
Small 
vessel 
Floating 
object 
5 knot 1 / 10 1 / 6 2 / 3 1 / 24 1 / 15 1 / 6 
10 knot 2 / 10 2 / 6 1 / 3 2 / 24 2 / 15 2 / 6 
15 knot 4 / 10 2 / 6 0 4 / 24 3 / 15 3 / 6 
20 knot 3 / 10 1 / 6 0 7 / 24 3 / 15 0 
25 knot 0 0 0 6 / 24 2 / 15 0 
30 knot 0 0 0 4 / 24 1 / 15 0 
 
The applied modelling assures that the majority of collision courses will be head-on. 
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 Visual time and Radar time 
Both visual time and radar time defines the time the given object will be visible.  The assigned 
conditional distribution is identical for both nodes and both nodes are therefore described here.  
The node is defined conditional on the relative speed of the object and the distance to the object. 
It is assumed that the major parts of the collision candidates are met head on. 
The object relative speed varies from 5 to 30 knots and the distance from 0 to 30 km.  This 
implies that the visual time will be in the range of 0 to 140 minutes.  In the modelling the node is 
given 45 states in the interval from 0 to 22 minutes, divided into intervals of 0.5 minute.  In the 
modelling the time interval of interest is truncated at 22 minutes wherefore all objects being 
visible more than 22 minutes are defined to be visible only 22 minutes.  This truncation has 
negligible impact on the analysis.  The node is purely mathematical and serves only to transform 
the distance and relative speed into a time period. 
 
Traffic intensity 
The node describes the mixed ratio of the effect of traffic intensity and confinement of area.  The 
node is modelled by the states: “Low”, “Medium”, and “High”.  The definition of these states is 
vague and may therefore be the subject of improvement if more detailed information becomes 
available. But it is important to note that even if solo watch keeping only can be allowed in 
situations with low ship traffic then there will always be a variation of the intensity of “low ship 
traffic”. The assigned probability distribution is: 
State Probability 
Low 0.70 
Medium 0.29 
High 0.01 
 
Manoeuvring time 
The manoeuvring time describes the required minimum time for performing an evasive 
manoeuvre.  The manoeuvring time is most easily evaluated in terms of required number of 
vessel lengths for performing the evasive manoeuvre since the manoeuvrability will be dependent 
on the vessel length.  Figure 3 below shows for different traffic intensities the probability density 
function for number of vessel lengths required for performing the evasive manoeuvre.  
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Figure 3: Probability density functions for the number of vessel length required in order to 
perform an evasive manoeuvre. 
The length of the considered vessel is 200 m and given the vessel speed the time for manoeuvring 
is easily calculated.  The node is discretised into 14 states, which are 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 
4.5, 5, 5.5, 6, 6.5, and 7 minutes. 
 
Time for visual and Time for radar 
The nodes “Time for visual” and “Time for radar” are identical and purely mathematical.  The 
node simply subtracts the manoeuvring time from the visual time and thereby gives the time left 
for performing the detection. 
 
Other alarms 
The node “Other alarms” describes the occurrence of other alarms during a watch that requires 
the attention of the OOW.  The node has the state “Yes” and “No” and the following probability 
distribution has been assigned: 
 
State Probability 
Yes 0.1 
No 0.9 
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OOW training 
The study [3] evaluated the training level of several OOW.  On the basis of the observations 
performed the following probability distribution have been assigned: 
State Probability 
Low 0.02 
Average 0.39 
High 0.59 
 
Stress level 
The modelling of the stress level is purely subjective.  The stress level is divided into the states 
“Low”, “Medium”, and “High”, although not associated with a psychological definition the 
applied modelling accounts for the effect of the stress level.  Special studies may refine the 
modelling of the stress. The node is dependent on both the OOW training level and the 
occurrence of other alarms.  The following conditional probability density is assigned. 
 
Training Low Medium High 
Alarms Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Low 2 / 10 2 / 10 2 / 10 4 / 10 5 / 10 7 / 10 
Medium 4 / 10 6 / 10 6 / 10 3 / 10 3 / 10 2 / 10 
High 4 / 10 2 / 10 2 / 10 3 / 10 2 / 10 1 / 10 
 
OOW task 
In the analysis the tasks of the OOW is divided into the following three tasks: 
1. Looking at the world 
2. Looking at the radar 
3. Other duties 
The tasks describe the primary task of the OOW.  The node models the ability of the OOW to 
divide his attention between the different tasks.  This ability is dependent on both the bridge type 
and the stress level. The following conditional probability has been assigned: 
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 Bridge Conventional Solo watch-keeping 
Stress Low Medium High Low Medium High 
World 55 / 100 55 / 110 55 / 120 70 / 100 70 / 110 70 / 120 
Radar 20 / 100 20 / 110 20 / 120 20 / 100 20 / 110 20 / 120 
Other 25 / 100 35 / 110 45 / 120 10 / 100 20 / 110 30 / 120 
 
In reference [3] the percentage of time spent on lookout duties and non-lookout duties were 
observed.  These observations were made for both the conventional and the solo watch keeping 
bridge under conditions that are judged to cause low stress levels. It was observed that 
approximately 50% of the time were spent on lookout duties on the conventional bridge, and 75 
% of the time on the bridge equipped for solo watch keeping. The applied modelling (55 % and 
75 %, respectively) therefore slightly favours the conventional bridge. The observation in [3] 
does not cover the time spent on looking at the radar and time spent on other duties.  The assigned 
probabilities for these tasks are therefore assessed subjectively, although it has been assumed that 
the fraction of time spent on looking at the radar are identical for the two bridge types.  The 
influence of higher stress levels is assumed to imply that more time is spend on other duties than 
the primary duties of the OOW. 
Alarm transfer 
A bridge safety system is used to ensure that an alert officer is present on the bridge this system is 
only present for the bridge allowing for solo watch-keeping and is modelled with three states: 5 
minutes and 10 minutes interval, and none. The bridge safety system is required to be connected 
to an alarm transfer system. The alarm transfer system has reportedly in [1] a mean failure rate 
during a watch of 2.4·10-5.  The remaining probability (1-2.4·10-5) is divided uniformly between 
the 5 and the 10 minutes setting interval. 
It is noted that the present study does not include a collision transfer system. 
 
Looking frequency and Radar frequency 
Both the looking frequency and the radar frequency is defined as the time between completions of 
full screening (and interpretation) of either the sea surface or the radar. The looking frequency 
will be dependent on the task of the OOW which are “Looking at the world”, “Looking at the 
radar”, and “Other duties”.  The OOW being engaged in a different task than, for instance, 
looking at the world does not imply that the OOW does not look at the world.  It implies that it 
will take the OOW longer time before a complete screening and interpretation has been 
completed. 
The modelling of the looking frequencies is illustrated in the figures below. 
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 Figure 4: Probability density functions for the world and radar looking frequencies, respectively. 
The mean frequencies are: 
Task Lookout mean frequency Radar mean frequency 
Looking at world 1 min 2 min 
Looking at radar 2 min 0.25 min 
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From the above it is seen that the duration of radar screening in average is 15 seconds.  If an 
alarm transfer system is present, then all the above-defined distribution for looking frequencies 
are truncated at the time interval defined by the setting of the “Alarm transfer system”. 
Both nodes are discretised into 17 states, which are 0.25, 0.625, 1.25, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.5, 
12, 14, 16, 18, and 20 minutes.  The probability of being in one of the intervals is calculated on 
the basis of the probability distributions shown in the figures above. 
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OOW visual and OOW radar 
The nodes “OOW visual” and “OOW radar” defines whether the OOW is able to detect the object 
within the given time period as defined by the node “Time for visual” and “Time for radar” given 
a specified looking or radar frequency.  As mentioned, the looking frequency models the time 
duration of one scanning of the sea surface, but one such scanning does not assure that the object 
surely will be identified.  The probability of detecting the object within a given time period is 
calculated under the assumption that the scanning sequence follows a Poisson process, that is, the 
duration of consecutive scans are independent.  The probability of detecting an object within a 
time period T given the frequency λ thereby becomes: 
)exp(1]detect[ TP λ−−=  
 
OOW acts 
The node has the states “Yes” and “No”, and represents an OR-gate.  The OOW is assumed to act 
if he either performs a visual detection or radar detection. 
Bayesian Network for a conventional bridge 
This section extends the formulated basic network to cover a conventional bridge.  The Bayesian 
Network for the conventional bridge is established by adding the effect of the rating lookout 
during watch keeping at night.  Both a rating lookout and the OOW could, in principle, detect the 
object by means of lookout and radar.  However, a rating lookout is not competent to interpret the 
radar and the rating is therefore not allowed to keep lookout by looking at the radar.  The 
presence of a rating lookout therefore only influences the visual detection.  The Bayesian network 
modelling the watch keeping of the conventional bridge layout is thereby established by 
duplicating the visual detection part of the network.  If the visibility during daytime becomes too 
low to assure safe ship operation, then the OOW will call a rating lookout to the bridge to assist 
the watch keeping.  The resulting Bayesian Network is shown below. 
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Figure 5: Bayesian Network for watch keeping on a conventional bridge. 
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Rating Call 
The node describes whether or not the rating will be called (or be present) conditional on the 
conditions of the visibility during daylight.  The node “Rating call” contains the states “Yes” and 
“No”.  It is assumed that the rating will be called only when the visibility is less than 1.5 km.  If 
the visibility is larger then he will never be called.  The assigned conditional probability density 
matrix is for the low visibility range given below: 
Visibility 0.25 km 0.5 km 0.75 km 1.0 km 1.25 km 1.5 km 
Yes 1 2 / 3 1 / 2 1 / 6 1 / 20 0 
No 0 1 / 3 1 / 2 5 / 6 19 /20 1 
 
Rating task 
The node “Rating task” describes the tasks of the rating.  These are “Watch” and “Others”.  On 
the basis of the observations made in reference [3] the rating is engaged in other activities 20% of 
the time.  If the rating has been called to the bridge because of low visibility or if low visibility 
occurs during night then it is assumed that he will be engaged in other activities only 5% of the 
time.  This modelling reflects that the rating will be more alert because of the low visibility. 
Rating frequency 
The rating is assumed to perform his lookout duty just as qualified as the OOW.  The frequency 
with which the rating lookout scans the sea surface thereby becomes identical to the looking 
frequency of the OOW. 
Rating visual 
The node “Rating visual” is modelled identical to the node “OOW visual”. 
Rating present 
The rating will only be present on the bridge during night or if he has been called because of low 
visibility.  The node is also an auxiliary node since the basic network contains information of 
both the conventional bridge and the solo watch keeping bridge.  The node is in state “Yes” if the 
bridge type is a conventional bridge and the watch is during night or the rating has been called 
because of low visibility.  For all other the cases the node is in state “No”. 
Rating inform 
The node “Rating inform” describes whether the rating will inform the OOW in the case that he 
detects an object.  The node has the states “Yes” and “No”, and it is assumed that if the rating 
detects an object then he will inform the OOW with the probability 0.9.  If he does not detect the 
object, then he, of course, will not be able to inform the OOW.  It is assumed that if the rating 
informs the OOW then the OOW will act. 
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Analysis of the conventional bridge 
This section describes the results of the analysis of the conventional bridge.  First we present a set 
of directly available results from the model.  Afterwards a verification of the model is performed 
by comparison to observed results.  In the analysis that follows the probability of the conventional 
bridge is set to one, and the probability of the solo watch keeping bridge is zero. 
The probability of the OOW not acting in time is found to be 0.00270.  This probability is 
calculated for the case of a rating lookout being present during darkness and in cases of low 
visibility.  By conditioning on the node “Daylight” is in the state “Darkness” the probability of 
the OOW not acting decreases to 0.00209, whereas during daylight this probability is 0.00330.  
These values are summarised in the table below 
Case P[OOW not acting] 
Day and night 0.00270 
Daylight 0.00330 
Darkness 0.00209 
 
From this it is seen that the rating contributes significantly to the overall safety of the vessel 
having the conventional bridge system.  We may quantify the effect of the presence a rating 
lookout on the system by calculating the probability of the OOW not acting conditional on the 
rating lookout not being present on the bridge.  For a daylight situation the probability becomes 
0.00331 whereas during darkness the probability becomes 0.00356.  It is seen that the effect of a 
rating lookout being present during darkness on the conventional bridge decreases the probability 
of the OOW not acting by more than 40 %.  The effect of the rating lookout being present on a 
bridge with the conventional bridge layout therefore has a significant impact on the ship safety.  It 
is also seen that the effect of calling a rating lookout in the case of low visibility during daylight 
has no impact on the ship safety.  Finally, from inspection of the node “Rating Call” we find that 
a rating is called to the bridge 2.3% of the time because of low visibility. 
In reference [3] observation on the watch keeping on a traditional bridge were performed under 
good weather conditions.  It was found that there were no significant difference between the 
daylight and the night situation.  If we condition on good weather in the Bayesian Network and 
calculates the probability of the OOW not acting we find for the day and night situation 0.00172, 
for the daylight situation 0.00224, and for the darkness situation 0.00120.  Thus, the model 
identifies a difference between the daylight and night situation, but the difference is small and it 
is doubtful whether it is possible to detect such small differences by observations. 
A so-called max-propagation may used to identify the most probable state of the nodes in the case 
of the OOW not acting in time.  Performing this analysis for the night situation results in the 
following observations. 
Both the OOW and the rating will be looking at the world.  Both the rating and the OOW will be 
performing this duty with a frequency of 1.25 minutes.  The condition of weather is good, and the 
type of object with which the vessel is on collision course is a floating object.  The most probable 
required time for manoeuvring is 1.25 minutes (with 1 minutes being more likely than 2 minutes).  
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The most probable state of the visual time of the object is 0.5 minutes, which reflects that the 
most probable object is a floating object. 
From the max propagation performed above we may conclude that a collision will most probably 
occur with a floating object.  The next step in the evaluation of the established network is 
therefore to evaluate the probability of the OOW not acting conditional on the object with which 
the vessel is on collision course.  The table below gives this probability. 
Object P[OOW not acting] 
    (Day and night 
P[OOW not acting] 
    (Daylight) 
P[OOW not acting] 
    (Darkness) 
Large vessel 0.00193 0.00264 0.00122 
Small vessel 0.00191 0.00267 0.00116 
Floating object 0.773 0.649 0.898 
 
It is seen that the model predicts that a floating object during darkness will not be detected in 
almost 90% of the cases.  During daytime the probability of not detecting a floating object in time 
is calculated to be 0.649.  From the table it is also seen that the probability of the OOW not 
detecting a large or a small vessel does not differ significantly. 
It is illustrative to perform a max propagation for the case when the OOW not acting when the 
vessel is on collision course with a large vessel. 
During the darkness situation when the rating is present the most probable condition for the 
weather is rain or fog.  The visibility will in this case most probably be in the range from 0.250 to 
0.5 kilometres.  The most likely stages of the radar range will be 30 km.  Both the rating and the 
OOW will be performing lookout duty, but it is more likely for the OOW to be engaged in other 
activities than looking at the radar.  The stress level of the OOW will be low. 
During daylight, where the rating lookout is not present, the most likely condition of the weather 
is good with high visibility and large radar range.  The OOW will most likely be engaged in other 
activities causing the most probable looking frequency on both the radar and the world to be 7 
minutes. 
Verification of model 
There has not been found much data that may be used for verification of the modelling.  Large 
part of the observations made in [3] form the basis for the applied modelling in the present study.  
Therefore only a few of these observations are useable for a comparison.  It was observed in [3] 
that when a rating lookout was not present lookout lapses longer than 10 minutes occurred 0.2% 
of the time.  We may compare this figure to the marginal distribution of the node “Looking freq.” 
in the Bayesian Network.  By summing all probabilities in this node that are larger than 10 
minutes we obtain 0.29%.  The values are comparable in magnitude. 
The second part of the verification study relates to the dependence of risk of collision on 
visibility.  In the study by Fujii [7] the number of traffic accidents in major straits in Japan and 
the associated visibility were registered from 1966 to 1971.  In [7] the relationship between visual 
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range and degree of risk was evaluated and it was found that the risk was approximately 
proportional to 1/r1.6, where r is the visibility.  In the establishment of this relationship the low 
traffic volume in low visibility was taken into account.  In the Bayesian Network presented here, 
no effects of reduced traffic volume in low visibility are included.  We may, however, calculate 
the probability of the OOW not acting conditional on a given visibility and conditional on the 
collision objects is either a large or a small vessel, only.  The figure is shown below. 
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Figure 6: Calculated probability density function for no action of the OOW as a function of the 
meteorological visibility. 
By establishing a double logarithmic plot of the probability of the OOW not acting conditional on 
a given visibility the sought relationship is found.  The figure is shown below. 
The figure shows the obtained double logarithmic plot for the entire visibility range.  The linear 
regression of the dependency is shown in the figures.  It is seen that for the entire range we obtain 
the relationship between visual range and degree of risk is approximately proportional to 1/r1.1 for 
the entire visibility range.  We see that the proportionality factor is comparable, but smaller than 
that given in [7].  The lower factor is to be expected since radar technology has improved during 
the past three decades.  The performance of the radar is especially important for the low visibility 
range since a visual detection in time is very unlikely, whereas it is very likely that the radar will 
detect an object in low visibility.  The impact of modern radar technology is therefore that the 
probability of not acting in time in the low visibility range decreases, whereas the probability in 
high visibility remains almost unchanged.  If the radar performance is decreased by assigning a 
higher probability of the radar to be in a fault situation, then the present model will predict a 
higher proportionality factor.  Some of the differences in this comparison may also reflect the 
difference between Japan and Northern Europe in the causes  (fog or heavy rain) for low 
visibility. 
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Figure 7: Double logarithmic plot calculated probability density function for no action of the 
OOW as a function of the meteorological visibility. 
 
Bayesian Network for a solo watch keeping bridge 
This section extends the formulated basic network to cover a bridge equipped for solo watch 
keeping.  The Bayesian Network for the solo watch keeping bridge is established by adding the 
effect of the backup when called.  Since the called backup is assumed to be a qualified officer, 
both the OOW and the backup, if present, may detect the object by means of lookout and radar.  
The presence of a backup therefore influences both the visual detection and the radar detection.  
The backup will by judgement of the OOW be called in critical situations when rough weather, 
low visibility, or high traffic density requires this in order to continue safe vessel operation.  The 
Bayesian network modelling the watch keeping of the solo watch keeping bridge layout is shown 
in Figure 8. 
Basically, the Bayesian Network for solo watch keeping is established almost only by duplicating 
the lower part (below “Time for visual” and “Time for radar”) of the previously formulated basic 
network.  This is because the backup is as qualified as the OOW and therefore may perform the 
same tasks as the OOW.  If the backup detects the object (either visually or by use of the radar), 
with which the vessel is on collision course, then he will inform the OOW who then will act.  The 
OOW must, however, first have decided that external conditions require a backup to be present 
on the bridge.  The backup may either be called because of bad weather, because of low visibility, 
or because of high traffic density.  Below we describe the new introduced nodes in the network 
modelling the solo watch keeping bridge. It is noted that we have not included backup calls due to 
technical failures. 
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Figure 8: Bayesian Network for watch keeping on a bridge equipped for solo watch keeping.  
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Weather call 
The node describes whether or not the backup will be called (or be present) conditional on the 
actual weather conditions.  The node “Weather call” contains the states “Yes” and “No”.  The 
assigned conditional probability density matrix is given below: 
Weather Good Storm Rain Snow Fog 
Yes 0 1 / 50 0 0 0 
No 1 49 / 50 1 1 1 
 
It is seen that it is assumed that the backup will be called only in case of a storm, that is when 
Beaufort is larger than 6.  The backup will, however, also be called in other weather conditions, 
but these cases will be related to visibility, which are described in the following. 
Visibility call 
The node describes whether or not the backup will be called (or be present) conditional on the 
conditions of the visibility.  The node “Visibility call” contains the states “Yes” and “No”.  It is 
assumed that the backup only will be called when the visibility is less than 1.5 km.  If the 
visibility is larger then he will never be called.  The assigned conditional probability density 
matrix is for the low visibility range given below: 
Visibility 0.25 km 0.5 km 0.75 km 1.0 km 1.25 km 1.5 km 
Yes 1 2 / 3 1 / 2 1 / 6 1 / 20 0 
No 0 1 / 3 1 / 2 5 / 6 19 /20 1 
 
This modelling is identical to the earlier modelling of the node “Rating call”. 
Traffic call 
The node describes whether or not the backup will be called (or be present) conditional on the 
traffic density.  The node “Traffic call” contains the states “Yes” and “No”.  The assigned 
conditional probability density matrix is given below: 
Traffic intensity Low Medium High 
Yes 0 1 / 1000 1 / 50 
No 1 999 /1000 49 / 50 
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It is seen that a relatively low probability is assigned to the backup being called due to the traffic 
situation.  This is because we only consider relatively low traffic densities as previously 
discussed. 
Backup called 
The name of the node “Backup called” is somewhat misleading since the node does not model the 
actual calling situation, but rather whether or not a backup will be present under the given 
conditions.  It would be a practicable impossible situation to model the specific case of the actual 
calling of a backup.  Modelling this would require modelling of how the joint weather and 
visibility process gradually would be changing and inclusion of uncertain threshold limits for the 
calling to take place.  Aiming at such a modelling is far beyond the scope of the present study. 
The node “Backup called” has the states “Yes” and “No”.  The node is an OR node defining that 
the backup is called if a weather call, a visibility call, or a traffic call has taken place. 
 
Backup training 
The training level of the backup is assumed identical to that of the OOW.  The modelling of the 
node is therefore identical to the modelling of the node “OOW training”. 
 
Stress level Backup 
The stress level of the backup is modelled as the stress level of the OOW when no other alarms 
are present.  A backup will, of course, only be called in critical situations.  It is, however, 
assumed that the backup will fell less stressful than compared to situations when alarms are 
present.  This since both the OOW and the backup will be able to discuss the critical situation. 
 
Backup task 
It must be assumed that there will be some co-ordination between the task of the backup and the 
task of the OOW.  If the OOW is concentrated on the radar, then it is more likely that the backup 
will concentrate on the “world” or other duties than also the radar.  The following conditional 
probability density has been assigned conditional on the task of the OOW: 
OOW Task World 
Stress level Backup Low Medium High 
World 70 / 100 70 / 110 70 / 120 
Radar 20 / 100 20 / 110 20 / 120 
Other 10 / 100 20 / 110 30 / 120 
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 OOW Task Radar 
Stress level Backup Low Medium High 
World 85 / 100 85 / 110 85 / 120 
Radar 5 / 100 5 / 110 5 / 120 
Other 10 / 100 20 / 110 30 / 120 
 
OOW Task Other 
Stress level Backup Low Medium High 
World 75 / 100 75 / 110 75 / 120 
Radar 20 / 100 20 / 110 20 / 120 
Other 5 / 100 10 / 110 15 / 120 
 
Looking frequency Backup 
The node is identical to the node “Looking freq.” 
 
Radar frequency Backup 
The node is identical to the node “Radar freq.” 
 
Backup visual 
The node is identical to the node “OOW visual” 
 
Backup radar 
The node is identical to the node “OOW radar” 
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Backup acts 
The backup will act if he either detect visually or by the radar 
Backup inform 
The node is a logical AND node.  If the backup is present and he detects, then he will inform the 
OOW, which then in turn will act. 
 
Analysis of the solo watch keeping bridge 
This section describes the results of the analysis of the solo watch keeping bridge.  First we 
present a set of results directly available from the model.  Afterwards a verification of the model 
is performed by comparison to observed results.  In the analysis that follows the probability of the 
solo watch keeping bridge is set to one. 
The probability of the OOW not acting in time is found to be 0.00155.  This probability is 
calculated for the case of both daylight and darkness.  By conditioning on that the node 
“Daylight” is in the state “Darkness” the probability of the OOW not acting slightly increases to 
0.00169, whereas the probability in the case of daylight is 0.00141.  This result agrees well with 
the observation made in reference [3] where no significant difference between the daylight and 
the night situation was found.  The results are summarised in the table below: 
Case P[OOW not acting] 
Day and night 0.00155 
Daylight 0.00141 
Darkness 0.00169 
 
By inspecting the marginal distribution for the node “Backup called” it is found that the backup 
will be present on the bridge 2.4% of the time.  By conditioning on the weather being in the state 
“Good” it is found that the backup will be on the bridge 0.049% of the time. Performing a max 
propagation leads to the same observations as obtained for the conventional bridge. 
 
Comparison of the conventional bridge and the solo watch keeping bridge 
In this section we shall compare a selected set of results from the analysis of the conventional 
bridge and the solo watch keeping bridge.  For all analysed cases the probability of the OOW not 
acting is calculated.  For each comparative condition the probability of the OOW not acting has 
been calculated for a “Day and night”, a “Daylight”, and a “Darkness” condition. 
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P[OOW not acting] : All weather conditions – all objects 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.00270 0.00155 
Daylight 0.00330 0.00141 
Darkness 0.00209 0.00169 
 
From the above table it is seen that the day and night probability of the OOW not acting is 
significantly lower (about 40%) for the bridge equipped for solo watch keeping compared to the 
conventional bridge.  It is also seen that the conventional bridge type during darkness – when a 
rating lookout is present – is almost as safe as the bridge equipped for solo watch keeping. 
P[OOW not acting] : All weather conditions – Large vessels 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.00193 0.000778 
Daylight 0.00264 0.000784 
Darkness 0.00122 0.000773 
 
The above table gives the probability of the OOW not acting in the case where the collision 
object is a “Large vessel”.  Again it is seen that the bridge equipped for solo watch keeping is 
much safer (about 60%) than the conventional bridge. 
In an evaluation of the obtained probability levels by the applied modelling we may calculate the 
probability that the object is a “Large vessel” and that the considered vessels collide.  We may 
calculate this probability in two limiting cases.  The probability of the two OOW’s on the two 
vessels may either be fully dependent or fully independent (being the most likely).  
 For the fully independent case the ship-ship collision probabilities becomes: 
 Conventional  Solo Watch 
Conventional 3.72·10-6 1.50·10-6
Solo Watch 1.50·10-6 6.05·10-7
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For the fully dependent case the ship-ship collision probabilities becomes: 
 Conventional  Solo Watch 
Conventional 1.93·10-3 1.93·10-3
Solo Watch 1.93·10-3 7.78·10-4
 
Comparing to the causation factors observed by Fujii [7] these values should be in the range from 
1.2·10-4 to 5.0·10-5.  We can therefore conclude that the applied modelling seems to result in 
probability levels of the correct order of magnitude. 
P[OOW not acting] : All weather conditions – Small vessels 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.00192 0.000788 
Daylight 0.00267 0.000794 
Darkness 0.00116 0.000783 
 
The above table gives the probability of the OOW not acting in the case where the collision 
object is a “Small vessel”.  Again it is seen that the solo watch keeping bridge is 60% safer than 
the conventional bridge.  It is also seen that the probability of the OOW not acting given that the 
collision object is a “Small vessel” is marginally lower than in the case of a “Large vessel”.  This 
is because the travelling speed of the “Large vessel” in general is larger than the travelling speed 
of the “Small vessel”.  This implies that the relative speed between the considered vessel and the 
“Large vessel” becomes larger compared to the “Small vessel” and consequently there is shorter 
time to detect the “Large vessel” than the “Small vessel”.  An effect that counteracts the effect of 
the travelling speed is the visual distance of the two objects. The visual distance of the small 
vessel in general is smaller than for a large vessel. 
P[OOW not acting] : All weather conditions – Floating objects 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.773 0.768 
Daylight 0.649 0.620 
Darkness 0.898 0.915 
 
In the table above is given the probability of the OOW not acting given that the collision object is 
a “Floating object”.  It is seen that there is a very high probability of not detecting a “Floating 
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object”.  It is also seen that the probability of the OOW not acting is almost identical for the solo 
watch keeping bridge and the conventional bridge.  “Floating object” can only be detected 
visually, not by the radar.  It is therefore also seen that a floating object is detected slightly better 
during darkness on the conventional bridge, where a rating lookout is present than on the solo 
watch keeping bridge. 
The above comparisons were made for all weather conditions and thereby also low visibility 
ranges.  If we compare the two systems in “Good weather” conditions only, implying visibility 
ranges larger than 10 kilometres, the following is found: 
P[OOW not acting] : Good weather – All objects 
Case Conventional bridge Solo Watch bridge 
Day and night 0.00172 0.00127 
Daylight 0.00224 0.00112 
Darkness 0.00120 0.00141 
 
First it is seen that the probability of the OOW not acting is almost 2 times lower than the all 
weather condition.  It is also seen that the probability of the OOW not acting is 25% lower for the 
day and night situation for the solo watch keeping bridge compared to the conventional bridge.  
For the daylight situation, the bridge equipped for solo watch keeping is 50% safer than the 
conventional bridge.  Moreover, it is seen that the probability of the OOW not acting during 
darkness is almost 20% higher than the conventional bridge system.  There are several factors 
influencing this result.  First, in the modelling of the node “OOW task” the probability of the 
OOW looking at the “World” was set to 55% in the case of the conventional bridge and 70% in 
the case of the solo watch keeping bridge.  According to the observations in [3] these numbers 
should have been 50% for the conventional bridge and 75% for the solo watch keeping bridge.  
Our modelling therefore favours the conventional watch keeping bridge.  We have applied this 
modelling since the node is relatively important for the results, and at the same time it is difficult 
to accurately access the time spend on the different duties.  If we either increases the fraction of 
time spend on the “World” on the solo watch keeping bridge from 70% to 75% or decreases the 
time spend on the “World” on the conventional bridge form 55% to 50%, then the probabilities 
becomes almost identical.  Consequently, if we assign the time fraction according to the 
observation, then the probability of the OOW not detecting becomes lower during darkness on the 
solo watch keeping bridge than on the conventional bridge. 
By inspecting the above calculated probability levels, it is seen that the results obtained for the 
conventional bridge is highly dependent on the rating lookout being present during night (or 
present 80% of the time) on the bridge.  If this not is the case, then the probability of the OOW 
not acting in good weather during darkness increases by a factor of 2 (to 0.00249) and becomes 
much larger than the above obtained result for the solo watch keeping bridge. 
Concluding remarks 
In the present report we have performed a comparative risk analysis study of a conventional 
bridge and a bridge equipped for solo watch keeping.  The analysis is based on a Bayesian 
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Network modelling where the data entering the modelling to an as far as possible extend is from 
registered data (mainly from reference [3]). Wherever possible we have compared results to 
registered data and good agreement has been found. 
On the basis of the results we can conclude that a solo watch keeping bridge is safer than the 
conventional bridge (approximately 40%).  It is found, however, that the conventional bridge 
better identifies floating objects during darkness than on a solo watch keeping bridge.  For both 
bridge types the probability of not detecting a floating object is very high and the impact of the 
difference in the two systems are therefore negligible. 
All in all, from the present modelling we may conclude that the solo watch keeping bridge 
equipped with Graphic Position Display and alarm transfer system is safer than the conventional 
bridge without these features. 
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Appendix A 
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Modelling of the Environment. 
The visual sense supplies a major part of the information necessary for avoiding traffic accidents 
and fog impedes this channel of information, even though the invention of radar has removed the 
limitation to a considerable extend. Sparre [8] reports statistic of wind, visibility, air temperature, 
cloud amount, and weather recorded for 13 different light vessels located in Danish waters in the 
period from 1931 to 1960.  Most of the light vessels have been located in inner Danish Water.  
Here we will only summarise the statistic for data recorded at the light vessel Vy1, since this 
vessel is located in the North Sea and is thereby judged to be more representative for the present 
study.  More precisely, Vy1 was located approximately at 55o23’N and 7o36’E.  Vy1 was not 
operating during the Second World War.  Each day six observations have been made.  The 
observation were performed at 4 a.m., 8 a.m., 12 noon, 4 p.m., 8 p.m., and 12 midnight C.E.T. 
(Danish time).   Although [8] only reports limited information on the correlation between the 
recordings of weather and visibility, the data have been found relevant for the present study. 
 
Wind is measured in Beaufort, and [8] give the following relationship to wind speed in knots: 
 
Knots Beaufort 
0 0 
1-3 1 
4-6 2 
7-10 3 
11-16 4 
17-21 5 
22-27 6 
28-33 7 
34-40 8 
41-47 9 
48-55 10 
56-63 11 
64-71 12 
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The probability density function for the wind speed is in [8] given on a monthly basis.  Here we 
have established the probability density function for the annual wind speed: 
 
Beaufort Frequency 
0 0,0180
1 0,1063
2 0,1848
3 0,2943
4 0,1897
5 0,1061
6 0,0609
7 0,0281
8 0,0090
9 0,0022
10 0,0006
11 0,0001
12 0,0000
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Visibility has been estimated since 1932 using the following scale: 
 
Code Meaning Objects visible 
0 Extremely dense 
fog 
Below 50 m 
1 Dense fog From 50 to 200 m 
2 Fog From 200 to 500 m 
3 Moderate fog From 500 to 0.5 nautical 
mile 
4 Mist From 0.5 to 1 nautical mile 
5 Low visibility From 1 to 2 nautical miles 
6 Moderate visibility From 2 to 5 nautical miles 
7 Good visibility From 5 to 10 nautical miles 
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8 Very good 
visibility 
From 10 to 30 nautical 
miles 
9 Excellent visibility More than 30 nautical miles 
 
It should be noted that visibility less than 0.5 nautical mile may occur for other reasons than due 
to fog, e.g. snow or heavy rain.  The annual frequency distribution for visibility have been 
established from the monthly given basis: 
 
Code Frequency 
0 0,0033
1 0,0057
2 0,0098
3 0,0097
4 0,0089
5 0,0113
6 0,0469
7 0,3229
8 0,5811
9 0,0004
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Fujii [7] has reported visibility ranges for the Japanese waters. To identify the frequency of the 
different visibility ranges, [7] has studied Lighthouse data for six different straits in Japan and 
related these to the visibility ranges of a referenced study by Nishikura.  The average frequency 
data and the associated visibility ranges are given in the table below.   
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Code Visibility Frequency 
Japan [%] 
0 0 – 50 m 0.04 
1 50 – 200 m 0.11 
2 200 – 500 m 0.16 
3 0.5 – 1 km 0.55 
4 1 – 2 km 1.77 
5 2 – 4 km 5.18 
6 4 – 10 km 19.65 
7 10 – 20 km 23.25 
8 20 – infinity 
(40) km 
49.28 
 
It is seen that the code definition of these visibility ranges (at least form code zero to code four) 
are in agreement with the Danish study.  Below the Danish and the Japanese visibility ranges are 
compared. 
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Comparison of Danish and Japanese visibility data
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The above comparison indicates that there is a higher probability of thick and dense fog in Danish 
waters than in the reported Japanese Straits. 
 
Ref. [8] also defines the distribution for wind forces given the visibility is less than 1 km (0.5 
nautical mile).  The annual distribution is given below. 
 
Beaufort Frequency 
0 0,0401 
1 0,2535 
2 0,2847 
3 0,2857 
4 0,0840 
5 0,0238 
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6 0,0091 
7 0,0104 
8 0,0054 
9 0,0023 
10 0,0009 
11 0,0000 
 
PDF for wind and visibility < 0.5 nm
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Air temperature has not been considered relevant for the present study. 
 
Cloud amount was estimated in tenths, that is using a scale from 0 to 10 in which 0=cloudless 
sky, 1= 1/10 of the sky is covered with clouds, etc., up to 10=sky completely overcastted).  The 
average cloud amount for the entire period is 6.79 having a standard deviation of 0.71.  There has 
only been observed a minor variability over the hours of the day. 
 
Weather was observed during the 24 hours, and a day with precipitation is one on which rain, 
sleet, snow or hail are observed at least once in the course of the day (which extends from 12 
midnight to 12 midnight).  The same applies to days with thunder and days with hail.  It is 
understood that days with thunderstorms or hail are included in days with precipitation. 
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 Month Precipitation Thunderstorms Hail 
Jan 18 0,0 2,3 
Feb 15 0,0 1,5 
Mar 13 0,0 0,9 
Apr 13 0,1 0,6 
May 12 1,5 0,3 
Jun 13 1,5 0,0 
Jul 15 2,9 0,0 
Aug 16 2,8 0,0 
Sep 17 1,5 0,3 
Oct 19 1,1 1,6 
Nov 20 0,5 2,2 
Dec 19 0,3 2,1 
    
Total 190 12,2 11,8 
    
Average 15,83 1,017 0,983 
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Number of days with thunderstorms or hail
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Besides the above given conditional density function for wind speeds given the visibility is less 
than 1 km [8] does not specify any correlation between wind, visibility, and weather. 
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Description of nodes 
 
Weather condition Days 
Summer days > 25C 10.2 
Ice days and nights 23 
Frosty days and nights 88 
Fogy days and nights 67 
Precipitation days or night 159 
Days and nights with large precipitation 16 
Days and nights with snow 25 
Days and nights with wind speeds larger than  
6 BF 
10 
Days or nights experiencing thunder 116 
Days and nights with thunder 11.3 
 
 
From [9] p. 9 1931-1960: 
   
Summer days > 25C 10,2 
Ice days and nights  23 
Frosty days and nights  88 
Fogy days and bights  67 
Precipitation days and 
night 
159 
Days and nights with 
large precipitation 
16 
Days and nights with  25 
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snow 
Wind speeds larger 
than  6 BF 
10 
Days or nights 
experiencing thunder 
116 
Days and nights with 
thunder 
11,3 
 
Weather: 
 
The following states are assumed relevant for modelling the weather - or rather for modelling the 
influence of weather on visibility and radar performance: 
 
Weather type Number of 
days 
Good 327 
Storm 14 
Rain or snow 19 
Heavy rain 0.5 
Fog 4.5 
 
The considered weather types and the associated number of days of occurrences are identified on 
the following basis: 
 
Fog: It is assumed that fog causes visibility to be less than 1 km and that fog only may occur 
when the Beaufort number is between two and four.  Assuming further that 75% of all visibility 
less than 1 km are due to fog, the probability of fog may be found by a summation over Beaufort 
wind speeds 2, 3, and 4, and subsequently multiplying this value by 0.75. 
Rain and snow: The annual average number of days with rain from 1931 to 1960 is given 
in [9] as 16 days.  The number of days with rain cannot be deduced from the Light vessel data [9] 
described in the previous section since that study registered occurrence of precipitation in any 
degree during the day.  However, 16 days of rain appears to be reasonable by comparing to the 
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12.2 days of registered thunderstorms and 11.2 days of registered hail given in [8].  No data was 
found which defined the number of days with heavy snow.  Ref. [8] indicates that snow in 
average is experienced 25 days of the year.  It is assumed that heavy snow occurs 3 days of the 
year.  In total, the modelling therefore assumes that rain or snow is experienced 19 days of the 
year. 
Heavy rain: No data was found which defined the number of days with heavy rain.  However, 
Ref. [8] report 12.2 days of registered thunderstorms and 11.2 days of registered hail.  It is 
therefore assumed that heavy rain occur ½ a day of the year. 
Good weather: Good weather is defined as weather with large visibility and wind speeds less 
than or equal to 6 Beaufort.  The resulting number of days is extracted from [8] as the number of 
days with Beaufort Nos. less than or equal to 6 and subtracting days with rain, snow or fog.  Good 
weather is present 327 days of the year. 
Storm:  Storm is defined as Beaufort wind speeds larger than or equal to 7.  Storm is present 14.5 
days of the year. 
 
Visibility: 
 
The node “Visibility” defines the probability distribution for the visibility conditional on the 
weather.  As no study has been identified which defines the required basis, these distributions 
have been established on a subjective basis.  As background material for the subjective 
assessment the marginal distribution for the visibility and some correlation between wind speeds 
and visibility.  In the assignment of the conditional probability density functions it was required 
that the assigned marginal cumulative density function should represent the observed cumulative 
density function for the visibility.  The assigned conditional probability density functions have 
been modelled as truncated Weibull distributions.  The upper truncations limit of the visibility is 
60 km, that is, in the modelling it is assumed that visibility larger than 60 km cannot occur.  The 
truncation limit has only impact on the distribution for the visibility in good weather.  The 
assumed distributions for visibility are given below. 
 
For information conditional expected visibility for the different weather conditions are given 
below: 
Weather Good Storm Rain/ 
snow 
Heavy 
rain 
Fog 
Expected visibility 28.9 km 6.8 km 4.0 km 0.45 km 0.45 km 
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 The parameters describing the obtained Weibull distributions are: 
Weather Good Storm Rain / 
snow 
Heavy 
rain 
Fog 
α 0.01174 1.007E-04 0.4083 1.910 1.910 
β 0.674 4.714 0.746 0.749 0.749 
γ 10.0 0.40 0.10 0.0 0.0 
 
The format of the Weibull distribution is 
)exp(1)( βαxxF −−=
 
Figures for all visibility types are given below: 
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It is assumed that the conditional probability density functions for visibility to rain and snow are 
identical.  
Comparison with measured data is shown below: 
Comparision of CDF's for measured and observed visibility.
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It is seen that the estimated marginal distribution resembles the observed data well.  
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